




cIARMOR: A DYNAMIC BUFFER OVERFLOW DETECTOR FOR OPENCL KERNELS

CHRIS ERB, JOE GREATHOUSE,
MAY 16, 2018

ANECDOTE




DISCOVERING A BUFFER OVERFLOW



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
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
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
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
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BACKGROUND: NORMAL BUFFER FILL




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
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
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
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
GPU INDUCED OVERFLOW



SHARED MEMORY CORRUPTION

▲ GPU can overflow buffers in system memory

– Over Interconnects like PCIe®




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


GPU INDUCED OVERFLOW



SHARED MEMORY CORRUPTION

- ▲ CPU and GPU as part of the same package




GPU INDUCED OVERFLOW



SHARED MEMORY CORRUPTION

- ▲ CPU and GPU as part of the same package
 - Every GPU buffer overflow may affect CPU data




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REMOTE CODE EXECUTION

▲ Overflows on GPU can cause remote GPU code execution

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
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
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
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
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GOALS



clARMOR: AMD Research Memory Overflow Reporter for OpenCL

- ▲ Software tool to detect buffer overflows caused by GPU
- ▲ Runnable with most OpenCL™ applications
- ▲ Low runtime overhead

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BUFFER OVERFLOW DETECTION METHODOLOGY



CANARY-BASED DETECTION

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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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- ▲ Absence of known canary values indicates an invalid write.
- ▲ Can find underflow as well!



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LAUNCHING AN OPENCL™ KERNEL



Buffer Create



Buffer

Set Arguments

Buffer

Kernel


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LAUNCHING AN OPENCL™ KERNEL




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
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


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


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
LAUNCHING AN OPENCL™ KERNEL WITH cLARMOR



Set Arguments

Kernel Information

Buffer
Metadata






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LAUNCHING AN OPENCL™ KERNEL WITH cLARMOR





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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Canary Verification




WRAPPING OPENCL™



clARMOR BETWEEN YOUR APPLICATION AND OPENCL

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 - Buffer, SVM, and Image creates
 - Argument setters
 - Kernel launches
 - Information functions



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TEST SETUP



HARDWARE SPECIFICATIONS AND BENCHMARKS SUITES

- ▲ AMD Ryzen™ 7 1800X CPU
- ▲ AMD Radeon™ Vega Frontier Edition discrete GPU
- ▲ ROCm 1.7
- ▲ 143 benchmarks in 14 benchmark suites


Suite	Num Benchmarks
AMDAPP	33
FINANCEBENCH	1
GPUSTREAM	1
HETEROMARK	9
MANTEVO	2
NPB_OCL	8
OPENDWARFS	7
PANNOTIA	6
PARBOIL	8
POLYBENCH	21
PROXYAPPS	6
RODINIA	19
SHOC	14
VIENNACL	8

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION



APPLICATION RUNTIME: WITH / WITHOUT TOOL


Lower is
better



PERFORMANCE EVALUATION



APPLICATION RUNTIME: WITH / WITHOUT TOOL



EXAMPLE USAGE



BAD_CL_MEM TEST

bin/clarmor tests/bad_cl_mem/bad_cl_mem.exe

```
~/tools/clARMOR$ bin/clarmor tests/bad_cl_mem/bad_cl_mem.exe
clARMOR: Final command line to run: LD_PRELOAD='~/tools/clARMOR/bin/../lib/libclbufferwrapper.so.1.0' PATH='~/tools/clARMOR:/bin:~/local/bin:/opt/rocm/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/usr/local/games:/snap/bin' CLARMOR_LOG_PREFIX="clARMOR: " CLARMOR_ERROR_EXITCODE=-1 tests/bad_cl_mem/bad_cl_mem.exe

clARMOR: Loaded CL_WRAPPER
Searching for platforms...
    Using platform: AMD Accelerated Parallel Processing
Searching for devices...
    Using device: gfx803

Running Bad cl_mem Test...
    Using buffer size: 1048566
Launching 262144 work items to write up to 262144 entries.
This will write 1048576 out of 1048566 bytes in the buffer.
clARMOR:
clARMOR: ATTENTION:
clARMOR: ***** Buffer overflow detected *****
clARMOR: Kernel: test, Buffer: cl_mem_buffer
clARMOR:     Write Overflow 1 byte(s) past end.
clARMOR:
Done Running Bad cl_mem Test.
clARMOR: Done!
```

EXAMPLE USAGE



GOOD_CL_MEM TEST

```
[~]:~/tools/clARMOR$ bin/clarmor tests/good_cl_mem/good_cl_mem.exe
clARMOR: Final command line to run: LD_PRELOAD='[REDACTED]/tools/clARMOR/bin/../lib/libclbufferwrapper.so.1.0' PATH='[REDACTED]/tools/clARMOR:[REDACTED]/bin:[REDACTED].local/bin:/opt/rocm/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/usr/local/games:/snap/bin' CLARMOR_LOG_PREFIX="clARMOR: " CLARMOR_ERROR_EXITCODE=-1 tests/good_cl_mem/good_cl_mem.exe

clARMOR: Loaded CL_WRAPPER
Searching for platforms...
    Using platform: AMD Accelerated Parallel Processing
Searching for devices...
    Using device: gfx803

Running Good cl_mem Test...
    Using buffer size: 1048576
Launching 262144 work items to write up to 262144 entries.
This will write 1048576 out of 1048576 bytes in the buffer.
Done Running Good cl_mem Test.
clARMOR: Done!
```

▲ What do the wrapped OpenCL™ library calls have to do?

- Buffer and Image creates
- Argument setters
- Kernel launches
- Information functions

▲ What are we doing to make the check faster?

WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



BUFFER AND IMAGE CREATION

▲ Buffer Creation

- Calls to *clCreateBuffer* or *clSVMAlloc*
 - Allocate buffer
 - Create sub buffer for user
 - Surround with canary

WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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Buffer


WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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
WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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



Image Creation

- Calls to *clCreateImage*, *clCreateImage2D*, or *clCreateImage3D*
- Potential for multi dimensional overflow
- Add canary regions to each dimension



WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



BUFFER AND IMAGE CREATION

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



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WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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



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Annotations for location of canaries, etc.

WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



BUFFER CREATION FROM EXISTING ALLOCATIONS

- ▲ OpenCL allows buffer creation using an existing memory allocation (host pointers and sub buffers)




WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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


WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



BUFFER CREATION FROM EXISTING ALLOCATIONS

- ▲ OpenCL allows buffer creation using an existing memory allocation (host pointers and sub buffers)
 - Cannot extend buffer




WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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


WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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


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


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


WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



BUFFER CREATION FROM EXISTING ALLOCATIONS

- ▲ OpenCL allows buffer creation using an existing memory allocation (host pointers and sub buffers)
 - Cannot extend buffer
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 - Solution using a temporary copy at run time




WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



SET ARGUMENTS

- ▲ cLARMOR needs to know which buffers/images to check for overflows
- ▲ Kernel information object
 - map kernel argument number to buffer information
- ▲ Update on call to *clSetKernelArg* or *clSetKernelArgSVMPointer*

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


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



WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



KERNEL LAUNCH

- ▲ Do the work of detecting buffer overflows
- ▲ On call to *clEnqueueNDRangeKernel*
 - Enqueue the kernel
 - Retrieve affected buffers
 - Run the canary check
 - Report errors





WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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


WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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



WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



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WRAPPING THE OPENCL™ API



GETTERS AND SETTERS

► GetMemObjectInfo, GetImageInfo

- Reserve space for canaries

► Enqueue Functions

- Read / Write / Fill / Copy
- Buffer / BufferRect / Image

ACCELERATION




SELECTING A DEVICE FOR PERFORMING CANARY VERIFICATION

► CPU is faster

- small / few canary regions (latency advantage)

► GPU is faster

- large / many canary regions (throughput advantage with embarrassingly parallel workload)
- reduced transfers over PCIe® by keeping on GPU



ACCELERATION




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
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▲ Maximizing asynchrony

- Event-based programming wherever possible
- GPU check kernels enqueue behind work kernels and wait on completion
- Evaluation of check kernel results is done with call-backs




ACCELERATION



USING OPENCL™ EVENTS TO INCREASE THROUGHPUT

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
ACCELERATION



USING OPENCL™ EVENTS TO INCREASE THROUGHPUT

▲ Maximizing asynchrony

- Event-based programming wherever possible
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CONCLUSION



clARMOR IS READY FOR YOU TO USE

- ▲ Canary-based detection scheme finds GPU write overflows
 - Memory buffers, Sub buffers, SVM, Images
 - Overflow and Underflow detection
- ▲ Works for most OpenCL™ applications
 - Running on GPU or CPU, not vendor specific
- ▲ Near real-time detection
 - 9.7% average overhead
- ▲ Open Sourced
 - <https://github.com/ROCM-Developer-Tools/clARMOR> - MIT
- ▲ Technical Details
 - *Dynamic buffer overflow detection for GPGPUs*, CGO 2017

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AMD

ANALYSIS OF TOOL OVERHEAD WITH SNAP_MPI



ANALYSIS OF TOOL OVERHEAD WITH SNAP_MPI



Example SNAP_MPI kernel launch

ANALYSIS OF TOOL OVERHEAD WITH SNAP_MPI



Example SNAP_MPI kernel launch

CPU


Application
Prelaunch

GPU

ANALYSIS OF TOOL OVERHEAD WITH SNAP_MPI




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
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
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
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
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


Possible improvement for SNAP_MPI kernel launch


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Possible improvement for SNAP_MPI kernel launch




ANALYSIS OF TOOL OVERHEAD WITH SNAP_MPI



Example SNAP_MPI kernel launch




Possible improvement for SNAP_MPI kernel launch




ANALYSIS OF TOOL OVERHEAD WITH SNAP_MPI



Example SNAP_MPI kernel launch



Possible improvement for SNAP_MPI kernel launch



Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



Kernel

```
__kernel void sw_compute0(...  
    const unsigned M_LEN,  
    ...  
    __global double *cu,  
    ... ) {  
  
int x = get_global_id(0);  
int y = get_global_id(1);  
cu[(y + 1) * M_LEN + x] = <input_equation>  
    ...  
}
```

Host

```
|     size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
|  
|     ...  
|     cu_ = clCreateBuffer(context_, CL_MEM_READ_WRITE,  
|                           sizeInBytes, NULL, &err);  
|  
|     ...  
|     const size_t globalSize[2] = {m_len_, n_len_};  
|  
|     ...  
|     err |= clSetKernelArg(kernel_sw_compute0_, 6,  
|                           sizeof(cl_mem),  
|                           reinterpret_cast<void *>(&cu_));  
|  
|     ...  
|     err = clEnqueueNDRangeKernel(cmdQueue_,  
|                                    kernel_sw_compute0_, 2, NULL, globalSize,  
|                                    localSize, 0, NULL, NULL);  
|
```

Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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```

$$\begin{aligned}x &= m - 1 \\y &= n - 1\end{aligned}$$

Host

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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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$$\begin{aligned}x &= m - 1 \\y &= n - 1\end{aligned}$$

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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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cu[(y + 1) * M_LEN + x] = <input_equation>  
    ...  
}  
    (y + 1) * M_LEN + x
```

$$\begin{aligned}x &= m - 1 \\y &= n - 1\end{aligned}$$

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| size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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cu[(y + 1) * M_LEN + x] = <input_equation>  
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}  
    (y + 1) * M_LEN + x
```

$$\begin{aligned}x &= m - 1 \\y &= n - 1 \\\xrightarrow{\quad} m &== M_LEN\end{aligned}$$

Host

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size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
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cu_ = clCreateBuffer(context_, CL_MEM_READ_WRITE,  
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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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}  
  
    (y + 1) * M_LEN + x  
    (y + 1) * m + x
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$$\begin{aligned}x &= m - 1 \\y &= n - 1 \\\xrightarrow{\quad} m &== M_LEN\end{aligned}$$

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size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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}
```

$(y + 1) * M_LEN + x$

$(y + 1) * m + x$

$x = m - 1$

$y = n - 1$

$m == M_LEN$

Host

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size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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    (n) * m + x
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$$\begin{aligned}x &= m - 1 \\ \text{y} &= n - 1 \\ m &== M_LEN\end{aligned}$$

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size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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$$\begin{aligned} &\rightarrow x = m - 1 \\ &y = n - 1 \\ &m == M_LEN \end{aligned}$$

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}  
  
    (y + 1) * M_LEN + x  
    (y + 1) * m + x  
    (n) * m + x  
    n * m + m - 1
```

$$\begin{aligned} &\rightarrow x = m - 1 \\ &y = n - 1 \\ &m == M_LEN \end{aligned}$$

Host

```
size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
...  
cu_ = clCreateBuffer(context_, CL_MEM_READ_WRITE,  
                     sizeInBytes, NULL, &err);  
...  
const size_t globalSize[2] = {m_len_, n_len_};  
...  
err |= clSetKernelArg(kernel_sw_compute0_, 6,  
                     sizeof(cl_mem),  
                     reinterpret_cast<void *>(&cu_));  
...  
err = clEnqueueNDRangeKernel(cmdQueue_,  
                           kernel_sw_compute0_, 2, NULL, globalSize,  
                           localSize, 0, NULL, NULL);
```

Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



Kernel

```
__kernel void sw_compute0(...  
    const unsigned M_LEN,  
    ...  
    __global double *cu,  
    ... ) {  
  
    int x = get_global_id(0);  
    int y = get_global_id(1);  
    cu[(y + 1) * M_LEN + x] = <input_equation>  
    ...  
}  
  
    (y + 1) * M_LEN + x  
    (y + 1) * m + x  
    (n) * m + x  
    n * m + m - 1
```

x = m - 1
y = n - 1
m == M_LEN

Host

```
size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
...  
cu_ = clCreateBuffer(context_, CL_MEM_READ_WRITE,  
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    (y + 1) * M_LEN + x  
    (y + 1) * m + x  
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    n * m + m - 1  
    m*n - 1 + m <= m*n - 1  
  
        x = m - 1  
        y = n - 1  
        m == M_LEN
```

Host

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size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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    ...  
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```
(y + 1) * M_LEN + x  
(y + 1) * m + x  
(n) * m + x  
n * m + m - 1  
m * n - 1 + m <= m * n - 1  
m <= 0
```

$x = m - 1$
 $y = n - 1$
 $m == M_LEN$

Host

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size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
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Hetero-Mark OpenCL™ 1.2 SW Overflow Error



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```
(y + 1) * M_LEN + x  
(y + 1) * m + x  
(n) * m + x  
n * m + m - 1  
m * n - 1 + m <= m * n - 1  
m <= 0
```

$$\begin{aligned}x &= m - 1 \\y &= n - 1 \\m &== M_LEN\end{aligned}$$




Host


```
size_t sizeInBytes = sizeof(double) * m_len_ * n_len_;  
...  
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...  
err = clEnqueueNDRangeKernel(cmdQueue_,  
                           kernel_sw_compute0_, 2, NULL, globalSize,  
                           localSize, 0, NULL, NULL);
```


EXAMPLE ERROR





```
clARMOR: Loaded CL_WRAPPER
clARMOR:
clARMOR: ATTENTION:
clARMOR: ***** Buffer overflow detected *****
clARMOR: Kernel: sw_compute0, Buffer: cu
clARMOR: First observed writing 1 byte(s) past the end.
clARMOR:
clARMOR: Exiting application because of buffer overflow.
```











clARMOR DETECTION RESULTS

LIST OF BENCHMARKS WITH BUFFER OVERFLOWS



- ▲ Parboil
 - mri-gridding
- ▲ StreamMR
 - kmeans
 - wordcount
- ▲ Hetero-Mark
 - OpenCL™ 1.2 kmeans
 - OpenCL 2.0 kmeans
 - OpenCL 1.2 sw, 4 errors
 - OpenCL 2.0 sw, 4 errors
- ▲ SNU OpenCL
 - CG (data races resulting in negative indexing, underflow)
- ▲ Note: These have been reported, and most fixed.

clARMOR DETECTION RESULTS

LIST OF BENCHMARKS WITH BUFFER OVERFLOWS



▲ Parboil

- mri-gridding

▲ StreamMR

- kmeans
- wordcount


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- OpenCL 1.2 sw, 4 errors
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clARMOR DETECTION RESULTS

LIST OF BENCHMARKS WITH BUFFER OVERFLOWS



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
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clARMOR DETECTION RESULTS

LIST OF BENCHMARKS WITH BUFFER OVERFLOWS



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
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- OpenCL 1.2 sw, 4 errors ←
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
▲ Note: These have been reported, and most fixed.



CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS



CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS

Data Corruption



CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS

Data Corruption




CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS

Data Corruption



CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS

Data Corruption



Segmentation Faults




CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS

Data Corruption



Segmentation Faults




CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS

Data Corruption



Segmentation Faults




CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS

Data Corruption



Segmentation Faults



Altered Control Flow (Security Subversion)



CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS


Data Corruption



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CONSEQUENCES OF BUFFER OVERFLOWS



DEGRADING USER EXPERIENCE, AND SECURITY RISKS

Data Corruption



Segmentation Faults



Altered Control Flow (Security Subversion)



RISK ASSESSMENT —
Elegant 0-day unicorn underscores “serious concerns” about Linux security

Scriptless exploit bypasses state-of-the-art protections baked into the OS.

DAN GOODIN - 11/22/2016, 3:48 PM